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RIGHT TO HOUSING
There are arguments against any character examination by the bar, as
ihere always are when constitutional rights are limited. However, it is
well established that the states may, within limits, ask questions to
ascertain the moral fitness of applicants before admitting them to the
bar. The state has no right to unlimited inquiry and the applicant has
no right to expect to be free from all inquiry. By prohibiting exclusion
when there is no showing that an applicant has been a member of an
organization with knowledge of its illegal goals and has entertained the
specific intent to further those goals, the Court has extended the rights
enjoyed by public employees to bar applicants.
DAVID M. RAPP
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and the "Right" to Housing
In 1950 California voters adopted article XXXIV of the state con-
stitution with the express purpose of bringing decisions of public housing
authorities which involved the construction of "low rent housing" under
the state's mandatory referendum procedure.' Some twenty years later
the Supreme Court of the United States, in James v. Valtierra,2 upheld
the constitutionality of article XXXIV against the charge that it denied
equal protection of the law to persons who though eligible for low-rent
housing lived in areas in which the referendums were defeated. More
specifically, James raised the issue of whether the requirement of a
referendum to construct "low rent housing" placed an unduly heavy
burden upon low-income persons by singling them out from other classes
of citizens eligible for public housing.
The case was first heard on the district level by a three-judge panel
'"No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired in any
manner by any state public body until" approved by the majority of the voters in the local electorate
where it is to be developed, constructed, or acquired. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1.
Article XXXIV was a response to the creation of housing authorities in each city and county
in California. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34240, 34327 (West 1967). These local bodies were
given the power to borrow money and accept grants from the federal government through the
United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1430 (1970). When the citizen-initiative
referendum procedure of article IV, § I of the state constitution was held inapplicable to decisions
of the local housing authorities in Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 219 P.2d
457 (1950), the stage was set for the passage of article XXXIV six months later.
2402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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in Valtierra v. Housing Authority.3 In ruling that article XXXIV was
unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection, the panel relied heavily
upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hunter v. Erickson.4 In
Hunter, an amendment to the Akron, Ohio city charter that required a
referendum on all ordinances which regulated the use of real property
on the basis of "race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry" was
declared unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. The amendment,
if approved, would have repealed Akron's recently enacted fair housing
ordinance. As in Hunter, the Valtierra panel found that article XXXIV
created a "special burden" not ordinarily required and that the impact
of that burden fell on minorities. 5
In reversing the panel and holding article XXXIV constitutional,
the Supreme Court, with Justice Black speaking for five justices,' offered
a three-fold rationale in favor of California's right to impose the referen-
dum restriction upon the state's voluntary participation in a federally
financed housing program. First, the majority contended, the district
court's reliance on Hunter was erroneous. The referendum procedure in
Hunter denied equal protection in that it made "distinctions based on
race," whereas California's referendum procedure could not be shown
to be "aimed at a racial minority" and is thus "[racially] neutral on
its face."17 The second prong of the Court's analysis was directed at
showing that even though persons desiring public housing were ham-
pered by the mandatory referendum requirement, they were not thereby
denied equal protection.' In essence, the Court said that legislation that
s313 F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal. 1970). The district court noted that article XXXIV had impeded
the financing of new housing, only 52% of the referendums submitted to the voters having been
approved. The court agreed with plaintiffs' argument that article XXXIV was expressly discrimina-
tory because it applied only to "low income persons" and was therefore squarely within Supreme
Court decisions "forbidding the unequal imposition of burdens upon groups that are not rationally
differentiable in the light of any legitimate State legislative objective." Id. at 4.
'393 U.S. 385 (1969).
5313 F. Supp. at 5.
'Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun
joined. 402 U.S. at 143. Justice Douglas took no part in the decision.
7402 U.S. at 141.
81d. at 142. The Court's argument seemed to be premised on the fear of a flood of litigation.
Assuming that the mandatory referendum procedure that "disadvantages" low income persons in
California denies equal protection, Justice Black foresaw the impossible task of examining entire
governmental structures to determine if their specific provisions "disadvantage" (and thus deny
equal protection to) any particular group of citizens. Id. Consequently, the second argument is
basically a distinction between "disadvantage" and "denial of equal protection."
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is disadvantageous to a certain group is not necessarily in conflict with
the equal protection clause. Finally, the majority emphasized the demo-
cratic nature of the referendum procedure. How, the Court seemed to
ask, could a procedure which gives everyone a voice in the decision
possibly deny equal protection through such a procedure?'
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE
In rejecting the three-judge panel's reading of Hunter, the majority
adopted a narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. It was
content to observe that unlike the statute in Hunter, the California
referendum provision contained no racial classification. No attempt was
made to determine whether any other kind of impermissible classifica-
tion is made by article XXXIV. Thus-the majority stopped short of the
central issue which the case raised-whether the poor constitute a minor-
ity entitled to special protection under the fourteenth amendment. In-
stead, the words "low rent housing" were treated, as the dissent pointed
out, as a "totally benign, technical economic classification."' 0 This in-
terpretation of the equal protection clause not only belied the Court's
earlier dictum in Hunter but was also contrary to the expansive inter-
pretation given that clause by a series of Supreme Court decisions
stretching over three decades.
An understanding of the "new" or expansive concept of equal pro-
tection, and the impact of James upon this concept, must begin with a
brief reference to traditional equal protection standards. The old for-
mula had two ingredients: it required that there be some rational nexus
between the classification and the purpose of the legislation, and it gave
a strong presumption in favor of rationality. 2 Most cases decided under
traditional equal protection criteria involved business regulations, the
great majority of which were upheld."
Though decided on the basis of state violation of the commerce
1Id. at 14243.
t11d. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"1393 U.S. at 393.
32Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21
STAN. L. Rav. 767, 768 (1969).
13Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-
Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 716, 721 (1969). See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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power, Edwards v. California4 provides a good starting point for consid-
eration of the Court's new approach to equal protection. Justice Jack-
son, in a concurring opinion, stated:
We should say now, and in no uncertain terms. that a man's mere
property status, without more. cannot be used by a state to test, qual-
ify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States. "Indigence"
in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying them. The
mere status of being without funds is a neutral fact--constitutionally
an irrelevence, like race, creed, or color.'5
The privileges and immunities clause did not, as Jackson advocated in
Edwards, become the tool by which the Court would seek to turn indig-
ence into a "neutral fact." The language which the Court eventually
seized upon was that found in the equal protection clause. Although the
use of equal protection to eliminate discrimination based on poverty has
had only limited application, the rationale for applying it has remained
similar to that expressed in Edwards.6
Only a year after Edwards, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,"7 the tradi-
tional equal protection test, based on judicial restraint, was given a sharp
new twist, and the concept of "invidious discrimination"'' 8 began to
emerge. The formula seemed rather simple. Whenever legislation is
based upon inherently suspect criteria, the burden falls on the state to
justify its actions. Lack of substantial justification constitutes invidious
discrimination and renders the law unconstitutional. 9 The "invidious
discrimination" formula has been the heart of the expansion of the equal
protection clause. The concept, as analyzed by Professor Kenneth L.
Karst, is based upon three inquiries: (1) Has there been discrimination
against a disadvantaged group? (2) Has this disadvantaged group been
denied a "basic right"? (3) Is there a "compelling government inter-
est" 20 which overrides the denial of that basic right?2 Use of the
invidious-discrimination formulation of equal protection has led to the
14314 U.S. 160 (1941).
15Id. at 184.
"See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
19 (1956).
1316 U.S. 535 (1942).
]Id. at 541.
"Karst, supra note 13, at 735.
2 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
21For a fuller treatment of the tripartite analysis of the invidious discrimination concept, see
Karst, supra note 13, at 739-46.
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recognition of "basic rights" in several areas. Douglas v. California,"2
in which the Court held that an indigent defendant has the same right
to counsel on appeal as a defendant who can afford an attorney, is an
example of the tremendous impact of equal protection in the area of
criminal procedure and of cases that recognize that discriminations
based on wealth may deny equal protection.23 In the civil area, Shapiro
v. Thompson24 held the right to interstate travel abridged by a Connecti-
cut statute that required a residency of at least one year before a person
was eligible for welfare payments. And in the area of voting rights,
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,2? in which the Court declared a
one and one-half dollar poll tax unconstitutional, is one of several cases26
eliminating property qualifications on equal protection grounds. Other
important affected areas include religion,21 political affiliation,'2  and
marriage and procreation. 29
This development has by no means proceeded in a clear and consist-
ent fashion, as can be seen from the Court's recent decision in Dandridge
v. Williams.3' If the decision in James can be said to have any recent
precedents, surely the Dandridge decision must be foremost, although
any reference to it in the majority opinion in James is strangely missing.
At issue in Dandridge was the adoption by Maryland of a "maximum
grant regulation" 3' for payment of benefits under the Federal Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Using this stan-
dard, an upper limit of 250 dollars a month per family was imposed by
the state, regardless of the number of children in the family. In response
to an equal protection attack, the Court found the regulation in issue to
be in the area of "economics and social welfare" and thus subject only
to the traditional "reasonable basis" test. 32 Although recognizing the
-372 U.S. 353 (1963).
13See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12'(1956).
24394 U.S. 618 (1969).
'383 U.S. 663 (1966).
2'See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam).
2Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
:'Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
"Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
-397 U.S. 471 (1970).
31Id. at 472-76. Because of the nature of the "maximum grant" standard, Dandridge is distin-
guishable from James. Dandridge is not a "poverty" case per se because the decision of the state
to impose a ceiling on AFDC benefits regardless of actual need discriminates not against indigents
generally but against a subclass of indigents-those with large families and thus greater need.
32d. at 485.
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"dramatically real factual difference"3 3 between this case and the earlier
business-regulation cases, the Court refused to apply a different stan-
dard. The majoity implicitly denied the presence of a "basic right" by
noting that its approach would be altered only by state action "affecting
freedoms guaranteed by the Bill oif Rights"" or "infected with a ra-
cially discriminatory purpose or effect such as to make it inherently
suspect. ' 35
The decision in Dandridge is not easily understood in light of
Shapiro and Levy v. Louisiana.3 Shapiro, though decided on the basis
of a right of interstate travel, held that a state may not deny welfare
payments solely on the basis of how long a person has lived in the state.
It would seem just as arbitrary to deny a dependent child payments
under AFDC simply because he was born to a large rather than a small
family. 37 In Levy, the Court reversed Louisiana's denial of wrongful
death benefits to children on the sole basis that they were illegitimate.
If illegitimacy is not a rational basis for denial of benefits, how can the
fact of birth to a large family meet the "reasonable basis" test? The
decision in Dandridge need not have considered the newer doctrine of
equal protection; under traditional equal protection standards, a rational
basis for the state regulation was missing s.3 Thus in Dandridge and Levy
there was no need to raise the question of basic rights and its accompa-
nying requirement that the state show a compelling interest. And in
Shapiro the difficult question of whether denial of welfare payments was
*Id. The Court admitted that the cass which were relied upon had "in the main involved state
regulation of business or industry." it went on to note that "[tihe administration of public welfare
assistance, by contrast, involved the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings."
Id. (emphasis added).
Uld. at 484.
"1d. at 485 n.17.
-391 U.S. 68 (1968).
"In striking down the residency requirement in Shapiro, the Court noted that the welfare
benefits in question were "the very means to subsist." The A FDC benefits in Dandridge were just
as essential to subsistence. On this basis Justice Marshall argued that the Court "has already
recognized several times that when a benefit, even a 'gratuitous' benefit, is necessary to sustain life,
stricter constitutional standards . . . are applied to the deprivation of that benefit." 397 U.S. at
522 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus the dissent would place the Dandridge case under the new equal
protection test or, at the least, require more than the majority's showing of "reasonable basis."
"Though Justice Marshall's dissent criticizes the majority opinion for failure to apply the new
equal protection test, note 37 supra, the thrust of his argument is directed toward the failure of the
Maryland regulation to meet the traditional "reasonable basis" test. The state's classification is
said to constitute a denial of equal protection without reference to whether a basic right was
involved. Id. at 517-530.
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a denial of a "basic right" to subsistence was avoided by reference to
the effect of an already established basic right to interstate travel. A
serious problem remains. Why, in Dandridge, upon finding a reasonable
basis for the state regulation, did the Court limit its consideration of
basic rights to guarantees of the Bill of Rights and issues of racial
discrimination? The new concept of equal protection is thus weakened
by the Courts classification of social welfare problems as "economic"
and subject only to the rational-nexus test of traditional equal protec-
tion. The denial of welfare benefits, though "economic" on their face,
results logically in the denial of such basic human needs as food, clo-
thing, and adequate housing. Of course, determination of the point at
which denial of welfare benefits constitutes infringement of other basic
rights may involve the Court in a very difficult task. The arduousness
of the endeavor, however, should not be grounds for refusing to under-
take a resolution of the issue.
An additional factor of considerable importance in recent equal
protection cases has been the willingness of the Court to look beyond a
legislative enactment which is non-discriminatory on its face to see if its
ramifications involve the state or local governmental body in invidious
discrimination. On this basis the Court declared unconstitutional a sec-
tion of the California Constitution which was intended to make possible
private discriminations in the sale or rental of housing. 39
Given this analysis of the development of equal protection, the
majority opinion in James appears to be inconsistent with previous case
law. Justice Black, basically an opponent of the expansive interpretation
of the equal protection clause,4" has breathed new life into the traditional
equal protection interpretation. Under that interpretation racial classifi-
cations are still "constitutionally suspect"4 and "bear a far heavier
burden of justification ' 42 than other classifications. By refusing to ex-
tend Hunter as the three-judge panel had done, the majority has said that
3'Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Accord, Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970). Both cases involved racial discrimination, and in each
case the Court found the state or local government to be "significantly involved in private discrimi-
nations." But cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
"Justice Black's opposition is perhaps most concisely stated in his dissenting opinion in Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); accord, Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,
196 (1969) (dissenting opinion). But see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Griffin v. Illinois,
51 U.S. 12 (1956).
"Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954).
"McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964).
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the burden of justification falls upon the states only in areas of racial
classification, and thus by implication other classifications, including
those based upon wealth, need only meet the requirement of rationality
unless they infringe upon a basic right. This was the thrust of Justice
Black's dissent in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,43 and it is the
heart of his argument in James.
The concept of "invidious discrimination" still has a very vague
and indefinite meaning for the majority of the Court. Professor Karst's
analysis of invidious discrimination as a series of three inquiries was, at
least fomally, not a part of the majority's approach. But, in a back-
handed manner, the Court did speak to the new concept of equal protec-
tion. Especially noteworthy is the statement that "a lawmaking proce-
dure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal
protection."44 Why is "disadvantage" not synonymous with "denial of
equal protection"? Using the Karst approach, the Court might respond
that though a disadvantaged group exists, they were not denied a "basic
right." And since no basic right is involved, there is no burden of justifi-
cation upon the state. This may account for Justice Black's opinion in
Williams v. Rhodes,4" in which the Court held that Ohio denied equal
protection by refusing to place the candidates of the American Indepen-
dent Party on its ballot. Voting, it appears, is a basic right.
There emerges a dichotomy which requires more explanation than
the Court has provided. Racial classifications, whether or not they imp-
inge upon a basic right, require justification. Undoubtedly, the four-
teenth amendment was framed with the plight of the recently freed slaves
in mind, but the language of that amendment does not indicate that
equal protection of the law was intended to mean only protection from
racial discrimination. Alexander Bickel concluded his study of the Con-
gressional debates over the fourteenth amendment with the following
observation:
Thus. section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, on its face, deals not only
with racial discrimination, but also with discrimination whether or not
based on color. This cannot have been accidental, since the alternative
considered by the Joint Committee, the civil rights formula, did apply
only to racial discrimination. 46
3Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
"402 U.S. at 142.
-393 U.S. 23 (1968).
6Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 60
(1955) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 50
RIGHT TO HOUSING
If Professor Bickel's argument is correct and the guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment are framed to deal with more than discrimination
with regard to race, then the Court in James cannot be said to have made
a judgment based on a historical understanding of the amendment's
intent. Rather, the Court made a judgment that the form of classifica-
tion based on race is more likely to produce invidious discrimination
than any other.
If the foregoing analysis of the Court's approach to the equal pro-
tection clause is valid, the problem posed by James, when considered
beside Hunter, is resolved. The classification involved in Hunter was
racial. Since all racial classifications must bear a heavy burden of justifi-
cation, such a burden was placed upon the city. It was not met. James,
on the other hand, did not involve a racial classification. Though the
same "right" to housing was involved in both cases, the non-racial
character of article XXXIV left it free of the burden of justification. This
assumes, of course, that the Court made a determination that the right
of low income citizens to federally financed low-rent housing was not a
"basic right."
The central issue of James should now be apparent: Does the consti-
tutional requirement of a referendum on the issue of "low rent housing"
(as opposed to other types of housing) deny to low income persons a
fundamental right without a compelling state interest in doing so?"
Further reduced, the issue is whether or not low-income persons have a
"basic" right to low-rent housing.4" Arguably a holding that recognized
a basic right to housing, at least as basic as some of those already held
to be so by the Court, could rest upon the ninth amendment49 or the
"By stating the issue in this manner, one of three possible alternatives for application of the
"new" equal protection is found to be the most useful. The alternative of wealth as a suspect
classification was explicitly rejected by the Court in James. By refusing to follow their earlier dicta
in Harper and Hunter the Court found that only racial classifications impose a heavy burden of
justification. A second alternative arising from an earlier discussion of Dandridge-that even
though a particular right in itself is not "basic," the denial of it may nevertheless lead logically to
the denial of other rights which are "basic"-has never been considered by the Court. See text
following note 38 supra. Thus, the third alternative-the invidious-discrimination formula-is
adopted. This approach is founded upon an inquiry as to whether housing in itself is a basic right.
"For instance, the right to interstate travel seems no more "basic" than housing, and yet it
has been protected under the equal protection clause. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
""The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 488-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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penumbra theory of Griswold v. Connecticut. The proposition is put
most squarely by the Congress in the Housing Act of 1949:
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security
of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require
• ..the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family .... 51
The issue of whether housing in this instance is a "basic right" was not
reached by the Court. But one thing is clear from its decision in James.
It has retreated from a number of its earlier statements concerning
poverty and equal protection, such as "[1]ines drawn on the basis of
wealth or property, like those of race .. .are traditionally disfa-
vored,'1 .2 and "a careful examination on our part is especially warranted
where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race. ' 53 Not only has
the Court refused to extend Hunter;54 it has, in James, refuted Justice
White's assurance in Hunter that
the State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making
it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any
person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another
of comparable size. 55
In short, the Court has added to the phrase "any particular group" the
proviso "characterized by race."
THE ISSUE OF PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE LEGITIMACY OF STATE
ACTION
The argument that the California law, in this case, has "denied"
nothing is readily apparent. The real effect of article XXXIV is to afford
the opportunity for local electorates to refuse to accept low rent housing.
The Court's emphasis was thus focused on the "concededly broad
power" 56 of the state over its political subdivisions. When asserting a
-381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5tAct of July 15, 1949, ch. 338, § 2, 63 STAT. 413. The wording is slightly modified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (1970).
5 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
uMcDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
m402 U.S. at 141.
0393 U.S. at 393.
mSee Comment, Federal Constitutional Limitations on State Power over Political Subdivi-
sions, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 704,711 (1961).
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constitutional limitation on this power, "it is logical to place a heavy
burden of persuasion on those asserting the limitation.""7 Under this
concept the Court can be seen to have applied an approach of self-
restraint,5" except when there has been an infringement of an express
constitutional provision.59
If the presumption in favor of the legitimacy of state action was
implicit in the Court's approval of article XXXIV, explicit was its reli-
ance on the basically democratic nature of referendums to guarantee the
fairness of the state's action in making the referendum mandatory on
the specific issue of low-rent housing. Whether or not this reliance on
the inherent fairness of referendums was justified is a question that
deserves serious consideration. The majority argued that "provisions for
referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimi-
nation, or prejudice.""0 To substantiate this assertion the Court pointed
to the long use of referendums throughout California history6 and the
requirement of mandatory referendums in other areas. 2 In considering
the Court's first justification, it must be noted that most of California's
"repeated use of referendums"6 13 have been of the citizen-initiative type
rather than mandatory. Careful examination of the Court's second justi-
fication is even more crucial. The Court listed three other instances in
which a referendum is constitutionally mandatory--constitutional
amendments, the issuance of long-term bonds,65 and municipal annexa-
tions and incorporations. 6 Of these three, only article XVIII (constitu-
tional amendments) was in existence before article XXXIV. More im-
portant is the fact that only the language of article XXXIV-"persons
of low income" 67-refers to a disadvantaged class. For instance, it would
be extremely difficult to find a class of persons who would prefer long-
term bond financing to other types of financing and thus be disadvan-
taged by a mandatory referendum before such financing could be carried
571d.
51See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
"Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
0402 U.S. at 141.
611d.
621d. at 142.
Old. at 141.
'ACAL. CONST. art. XVIII (as amended 1962).
'rCAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 40 (added 1970).
"CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 2(b) (added 1970).
"CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1.
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out."s Thus the other areas in which mandatory referendums are prov-
ided, with the possible exception of the municipal annexation provision,
involve fundamentally different considerations than article XXXIV.
Even article XI (municipal annexation) does not make a classification
on its face by a reference such as "low rent housing."
On the surface, the referendum procedure guarantees fairness. But
one must also consider the necessity of protecting minorities from the
possibility that the majority's will may be unjust. Alexis de Tocqueville's
warning, issued in 1839, still rings true:
In my opinion the main evil of the present democratic institutions of
the United States does not arise . . . from their weakness, but from
their overpowering strength; and I am not so much alarmed at the
excessive liberty which reigns in that country. as at the very inadequate
securities which exist against tyranny."
The reality which article XXXIV embodies is that the majority, through
a locality-by-locality approach, can decide that low-income persons in
certain areas will not receive low-rent housing. This power is tantamount
to a decision as to where the poor in California may live. As the
Valtierra panel noted, only fifty-two percent of the referendums submit-
ted under article XXXIV have been approved. 70 Thus, no matter how
"democratic" referendums are in theory, the crucial question is whether
or not they are "fair." Has the indigent minority been denied the equal
protection of the law by the article XXXIV requirement that low income
housing proposals be submitted to the whims of the local electorate?
Without denying the broad power of the state over its municipalities, this
question must also be asked and balanced against the presumption that
the state has acted legitimately.
CONCLUSION
James v. Valtierra is the site of two significant collisions. The first
is between two concepts of equal protection-traditional and expansive;
the second is between the equal protection clause and the broad power
6'Cf. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). In this case the Court upheld a West Virginia
constitutional provision which required that 60% of the voters in a referendum election approve
bonded indebtedness. The majority stated that it could "discern no independently identifiable group
or category that favors bonded indebtedness over other forms of financing." Id. at 5.
"'A. DE TocQuEVILLE, DEMtOCRACY IN AMERICA 256 (1839).
70313 F. Supp. at 3.
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of states over their political subdivisions. Avoiding collisions, as any
seaman knows, is the essence of good navigation, but to fail to recognize
these two "collisions." as the Court has done in James, is to make
another collision inevitable.7' Had the Court faced the issues squarely,
the result might have been different. Certainly this analysis indicates that
housing should be considered as "basic" a right as some of those ac-
corded special status by recent Supreme Court decisions preceding
James. It should be clear, also, that reliance on the "democratic" nature
of referendums is not a sufficient deterrent against state denial of equal
protection. One must, however, consider that James may be an attempt
to return to an earlier understanding of the equal protection clause, in
which event an attempt to speak of basic rights, aside from the area of
racial discrimination, would be pointless. Furthermore, one must be
aware that there are legitimate state interests, namely reduction of the
tax base and increased burdens on public facilities, which make low-rent
housing less desirable than other types of housing. Yet, in view of the
complexity of society's problems as a whole, the economic imperatives
demand that housing be the major priority in urban planning. The de-
mand of the equal protection clause seems equally clear-that "the State
may . .. [not] disadvantage any particular group by making it more
difficult to enact legislation in its behalf. ' 72 One must conclude that the
privilege of all Americans to choose their neighbors, however basic,
should not take precedence over the more fundamental right of every
citizen to a decent home.
While the equal protection clause, even in its newer manifestations.
should not be construed as a tool for achieving social egalitarianism, it
may yet play a significant role in narrowing the gap between rich and
poor. That role-essential to republican government-is to protect mi-
norities from the power of local and state electoral majorities who would
use the ballot box to transform their prejudices into law. In their fear
of the broader implications of equal protection, the majority in James
v. Valtierra has retreated from the performance of this essential func-
71Such "collision" may come sooner than expected. In Serrano v. Priest, - Cal. 3d
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), the Supreme Court of California recently ruled the
California School financing scheme, based on property taxes, unconstitutional as a denial of equal
protection. In doing so, the court recognized education as a basic right and called for a strict
standard of review. See also Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, - F. Supp. - (D. Minn. 1971);
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., __ F. Supp. - (W.D. Tex. 1971).
7 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969).
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tion. Hopefully, that retreat is only a temporary regrouping. and James
may yet be considered as an aberration rather than the initiation of a
trend.
JIM D. COOLEY
Constitutional Law-Fighting Words or Free Speech?
During its history of roughly thirty years, the "fighting words"
doctrine' has been an often cited but seldom controlling limitation in the
area of first amendment freedom of speech. In the recent case of Cohen
v. California,2 the Supreme Court acknowledged the continuing vitality
of the "fighting words" doctrine but rejected the contention of the State
of California that it was controlling in that particular case. Paul Robert
Cohen was convicted of violating a California statute which prohibits
"maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neigh-
borhood or person . . . by . . .offensive conduct."' 3 His arrest resulted
from his wearing a jacket inscribed with "Fuck the Draft" plainly
visible while walking through the Los Angeles County Courthouse.
Cohen claimed that the jacket stated his feelings about the war in Viet-
nam and the draft and that his expression was constitutionally protected.
In affirming Cohen's conviction the California Court of Appeals inter-
preted "offensive conduct" to mean "behavior which has a tendency to
provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace." 4 The
'Under the "fighting words" doctrine inflammatory words that are used in a manner calcu-
lated to provoke a breach of the peace are excluded from the first amendment protection generally
afforded speech. The term itself comes from the following passage: "'The English language has a
number of words and expressions which by general consent are "fighting words" when said without
a disarming smile. . . .Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight. So are
threatening, profane or obscene revilings.'" Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573
(1942), quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 320, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (1941).
2403 U.S. 15 (1971).
3CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970).
'People v. Cohen, I Cal. App. 3d 94, 100, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (1969) (emphasis by the
court). In explaining its interpretation, the court said: "As modified by case law the only 'offensive'
conduct prohibited by section 415 is that which incites violence or has a tendency to incite others
to violence or a breach of the peace. . . .This standard . . . eliminates prosecutions or convictions
for conduct which is merely offensive." Id. at 102, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 508 (emphasis added). Recent
Supreme Court holdings clearly establish that the exercise of constitutional rights may not be
impinged upon merely because the exercise in some way offends the sensibilities ofsome individuals.
In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (the flag-burning case), the Court said, "It is
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